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Abstract 
 
Based on Paul Ricœur’s concept of ipseity and the role of promising for constituting 
selfhood as non-identical permanence in time, the article revisits the controversy 
whether or not the young man in Repetition experiences a repetition of the self. Con-
sidering Hans Lipps’s notion of the radical openness of a promise based on solicitude 
as much as Ricœur’s “fundamental promise” to be faithful to oneself, two different 
perspectives are provided in order to interpret the young man’s break with his fiancée. 
According to both perspectives it can coherently be claimed that in the realm of ethi-
cal selfhood as depicted by Ricœur in Oneself as Another and The Course of Recogni-
tion, the young man non-identically repeats his self. 
 
 
I. The Problem of Repetition 
 
Hardly any other text by Kierkegaard has caused so much scholarly disagreement than 
Repetition. On the just about 100 pages of the Venture in Experimental Psychology, 
Kierkegaard’s heteronym Constantin Constantius presents the reader with a wide ar-
ray of topics: he discusses the category of repetition in comparison with the Ancient 
Greeks’ understanding of anamnesis, change and motion, he describes a trip to Ger-
many, and he also extensively comments on the life of a younger confidant, whom he 
simply calls the young man.  
																																																								
* This paper has been presented at the conference Reconsidering the Existential: the Aesthetic, the Eth-
ical, the Religious at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre in Copenhagen, 2016. I am thankful for 
the advice and feedback from the participants. 
		
2	
 
In the beginning, Constantin expresses his premonition that just as the Ancient 
Greeks taught “that all knowing is recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all 
life is a repetition”1—but this conviction soon withers and gives way to the skeptical 
question whether repetition as such is possible at all. Constantin’s experimental jour-
ney to Berlin is clearly marked as a failure to repeat a former travel experience, and so 
the story of the young man becomes the center of the question: is repetition possible? 
But first of all: what is to be repeated? As Constantin’s attempt to re-
experience the same encounters, situations, feelings and moods he had when he visit-
ed Berlin for the first time shows (be it the weather, a show at the theatre, or the do-
mestic situation of his landlord), he tries to evoke an identical repetition of something 
external. This, as it soon becomes obvious, is not feasible. Constantin therefore con-
cludes that repetitions are not possible. But in the letters attached to Constantin’s 
study, we hear the young man say: “I am myself again. This ‘self’ that someone else 
would not pick up of the street I have once again.”2 It thus seems that repetition may 
occur in the relation of a self to itself. Moreover, in a polemical letter to Heiberg, 
Kierkegaard has Constantin proclaim that there is only one true repetition, and this is 
“the individuality’s own repetition raised to a new power.”3 Thus, the what of the rep-
etition in question is the self—this is what scholars agree upon. There are, however, 
different opinions on whether or not the young man actually did experience a repeti-
tion in this sense.  
What would a repetition of the self imply? The Kierkegaardian reader, familiar 
with the Dane’s writings, usually assumes that the self is repeated in the movement 
																																																								
1 SKS 4, 9 / R, 131. For the theological and philosophical implications of the statement including the 
addition that “The only modern philosopher who had an intimation of this is Leibniz” (ibid), see Paul J. 
DeHart, “‘The passage from mind to heart is so long…’: The riddle of ‘repetition’ and Kierkegaard’s 
ontology of agency”, Modern Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 91-122. 
2 SKS 4, 87 / R, 220. 
3 Pap. IV B111:270 / R, Supplement, p. 294. 
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from one existential stage to another, thereby being “raised to a new power”4: the eth-
ical self in a way is the same self which it has been when it was an aesthetic self, yet it 
is different in how it relates to itself and others; and the religious self can be under-
stood as a specific repetition of the ethical self under the paradigm of the absurd. 
However, are there, in addition to the three existential stages, other ways to describe a 
repetition of the self in Kierkegaard’s thought?  
In the following, I would like to approach Gjentagelsen from a Ricœurian per-
spective, concentrating on the young man. After a short description of what happens 
to the young man and how it has been interpreted in the literature (II.), I will turn to 
Ricœur’s understanding of the self as explained in Oneself as Another and The Course 
of Recognition (III.). A short analysis of the phenomenon of promising then distin-
guishes between keeping one’s word in a narrow sense, fulfilling a promise in a 
broader sense, and staying faithful to oneself (IV.). Based on these considerations, the 
question of a potential repetition of the young man’s self is finally approached again 
(V. and VI.). 
 
 
II. “The Remarkable Change” of the Young Man 
 
The young man’s story, similar to other young men’s stories in Kierkegaard’s work, is 
easily told in a few sentences: He is “fervently and beautifully and humbly in love”5 
with a girl, but then he experiences a severe personal crises, breaks the engagement, 
and leaves town. As his letters show, it takes him almost a year to come to grips with 
what he has done, and with what this episode of his life has done to him.  																																																								
4 Ibid.	
5 SKS 4, 12 / R, 134. 
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Constantius, who is deeply fascinated by the unfolding of these events, pro-
vides a ready explanation for the young man’s transformation from someone who was 
vigorous, open-minded and who “glowed with love,”6 to someone increasingly en-
trapped in depression: “During all this, a remarkable change took place in him. A po-
etic creativity awakened in him on a scale I had never believed possible. Now I easily 
grasped the situation. The young girl was not his beloved: she was the occasion that 
awakened the poetic in him and made him a poet.”7 According to his letters, the 
young man becomes nauseated by life because he sees himself unable to fulfill the 
expectations that he has raised in the nameless girl—his poetic longings and ambi-
tions would clash with a concrete marriage and moreover, harm the girl.  
Constantius describes the situation more relentlessly: “If she died tomorrow, 
that would not distress him further, he would not actually feel a loss,”8 because “the 
girl was not an actuality but a reflection of motions within him and an incitement of 
them.”9 In Constantin’s view, the girl simply fulfilled the role of generating the idea 
of eternal love in the young man, thus providing him with a source of poetic inspira-
tion. This source never runs dry because it is safely kept in recollection and has cut 
off all links with the actual relation: “She was drawn into his whole being; the 
memory of her was forever alive. She had meant much to him; she had made him a 
poet—and precisely thereby had signed her own death sentence.”10 
In contrast to Constantin’s harsh words, however, stands the young man’s suf-
fering after the break-up. He is restless. He got what he wanted, his freedom, but he 
cannot move on. Quite to the contrary, he is doing his best to turn himself into a fu-
ture husband. He tries to “clip himself” and to “take away everything that is incom-																																																								
6 SKS 4, 13 / R, 135. 
7 SKS 4, 15 / R, 137f. 
8 SKS 4, 55 / R, 185. 
9 SKS 4, 55 / R, 185. 
10 SKS 4, 15 / R, 138. 
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mensurable in order to become commensurable”11—without success. Like the beard 
he shaves off every morning, all the “impatience and infinite striving“12 of his soul 
grow back again. He also quarrels with fate and vehemently refuses to regard himself 
as guilty.  
But then, when the young man sees a wedding announcement in the newspa-
per that tells him that his former fiancée has married someone else, he suddenly feels 
healed: “I am myself again…The inveiglements in which I was entrapped have been 
rent asunder; the magic formula that hexed me so that I could not come back to my-
self has been broken.”13 The young man seems to regard this as a repetition, at least 
he suggests it by asking rhetorically, “Is there not, then, a repetition? Did I not get 
everything double? Did I not get my self again and precisely in such a way that I 
might have a double sense of its meaning?”14  
Did he really? The question whether or not one can talk about a true repetition 
in the young man’s case has stirred a profound scholarly discussion. Some say the 
young man truly did experience a repetition, because the latter is all about becoming 
inward, and his reflections on guilt and fate testify that he moves from an aesthetic 
attitude, through an encounter with ethics, to the claim of being an exemption to ethi-
cal judgments.15 Others go even further and claim that the young man actually repeats 
himself under the paradigm of the religious. For instance, Catherine Pickstock argues 
that “he receives back his own non-identically repeated integrity beyond the travails 
of melancholia and anxiety”, acquiring faith “in the ‘absurd’ eternal return of the re-
																																																								
11 SKS 4, 81 / R, 214. 
12 SKS 4, 81 / R, 214. 
13 SKS 4, 88 / R, 221. 
14 SKS 4, 87f. / R, 220f. 
15 See for instance Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming. Movements and Positions, 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 2005, p. 83 and Wilfried Greve, Kierkegaards maieu-
tische Ethik. Vom Entweder/Oder II zu den Stadien, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1990, pp. 150-59. 
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nounced beloved.”16 According to Pickstock, “this experience, he thinks, now fits him 
to marriage after all, since his new sense of his deep self as the pure divine gift trans-
cends all possible anxious and tragic contamination and suggests that he can be a wel-
come bridegroom.”17 Following this interpretation, the fact that the young man’s be-
loved is marrying someone else does not change anything: the young man has re-
ceived his self again, it has been repeated as a religious self. But scholars strongly dis-
sent on this point: The young man, some allege, is so relieved to read about his former 
fiancée’s marriage, that he misinterprets this feeling as repetition. He has not changed 
at all. Readily he casts himself into the self-indulgence of his imagination, now cut-
ting off even the last connection with actuality; his ecstatic “three cheers for the flight 
of the thought”18 and for “the dance in the vortex of the infinite”19 illustrate nothing 
more than that. Thus, Jochen Schmidt concludes, “there is no repetition within Repeti-
tion. It is only by the intertextual interplay with Fear and Trembling that Repetition is, 
albeit indirectly, related to genuine hope, as it is by the virtue of the absurd that the 
knight of faith, unlike the knights of infinity, knows to return to earth.”20 
I do not want to take a stance on which interpretation is more adequate, if any. 
The aforementioned scholars approach Repetition from different theoretical back-
grounds, and their interpretations all provide enlightening perspectives on the catego-
ry of repetition in Kierkegaard’s thought, especially considering the intriguing fact 
that in Repetition, we are actually dealing with the self-interpretation of a literary fig-
ure depicted by a heteronymous author. What this short overview shows, however, is 																																																								
16 Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 138. 
17 Ibid, p. 139. And furthermore, so Pickstock, „[i]f his older confidant, Constantin Constantius, sus-
pects him of merely lapsing back into the aesthetic, then this is because, as he himself confesses, he has 
no feeling for the religious beyond the ethical” (ibid., p. 138f.). 
18	SKS 4, 88 / R, 222.	
19 SKS 4, ibid. / R, ibid. 
20 Jochen Schmidt, “The Young Man: Voice of Naïveté”, in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms, ed. by Katalin 
Nun, Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate 2015 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, 
vol. 17), pp. 303-309, p. 307. 
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that the question about the young man’s self and its repetition is a highly complicated 
one, and for this reason, it might be instructive to look for additional criteria and con-
cepts to come to grips with it. In the next section, I would therefore like to turn to Paul 
Ricœur’s understanding of the self.  
 
 
III. Character, Promising, and Self-Constancy Throughout Time 
 
When Ricœur’s concept of selfhood is applied to Kierkegaard’s thought, it is usually 
done with regard to narrative identity. In the last ten years, a profound theoretical shift 
has taken place in the literature on Kierkegaard’s understanding of the self, concen-
trating on the role of narrativity in the constitution of personal identity in general.21 
One could, however, question that identity is the right term for the phenomenon of 
selfhood as described by Kierkegaard. After all, The Concluding Unscientific Post-
script stresses that “the principle of identity is only the boundary; it is like the blue 
mountains, like the line which the artist calls the base line—the drawing is the main 
thing.”22 In the following, I will thus focus not so much on the concept of narrative 
identity, even though the young man’s reading of the Book of Job in Repetition pro-
vides ample opportunities to interpret his repetition as a refiguration.23 Instead, it is 
																																																								
21 For a general investigation of narrativity and selfhood in Kierkegaard’s thought see Narrative, Iden-
tity and the Kierkegaardian Self, ed. by John Lippitt and Patrick Stokes, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press 2015. For a discussion of Kierkegaard in the context of modern and contemporary theories of 
personal identity see John J. Davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: from Frankfurt 
and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard, New York: Routledge 2012; Anthony Rudd, Self, Value, and Narra-
tive: A Kierkegaardian Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, esp. pp. 175-228; Patrick 
Stokes, The Naked Self. Kierkegaard and Personal Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, 
pp. 166-91; and the seminal edition by John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, Kierkegaard After Mac-
Intyre. Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court 2001. 
22 SKS 7, 383 / CUP1, 421. I owe this insight to personal conversations with Jeff Hanson, who also 
drew my attention to the quoted passage. 
23 Cf. Joakim Garff, “A Matter of Mimesis: Kierkegaard and Ricœur on Narrative Identity”, Kierke-
gaard Studies Yearbook, 2015, pp. 321-334, p. 331f. 
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Ricœur’s concept of ethical selfhood and its core, the promise, that I will apply to the 
story of the young man.24 
Ricœur dedicates the fifth study of Oneself as Another to a question similar to 
the problem of the self’s repetition in Gjentagelsen: “Is there a form of permanence in 
time which can be connected to the question ‘who?’ inasmuch as it is irreducible to 
any question of ‘what?’? Is there a form of permanence in time that is a reply to the 
question ‘who am I?’?“25 In order to address this question, Ricœur distinguishes be-
tween identity or mêmeté as sameness (as denoted by Latin idem) and identity as self-
hood or ipséité (derived from Latin ipse). Usually, both constitute our understanding 
of ourselves and others in time. Ricœur stresses that permanence in time is crucial for 
us—after all, we need to be able to recognize others and ourselves throughout the 
years.  
One mode of permanence in time is character, which Ricœur defines as “set 
of distinctive marks which permit the re-identification of a human individual as being 
the same.”26 This does not mean that a character is totally fixed. But we have some 
dispositions that appear to constitute the unchangeable basis for the habits we acquire 
or get rid of, and for our preferences, opinions and identification with ideas, values, 
and norms. In character, there is almost a complete overlap of sameness and ipseity. 
In contrast, faithfulness to oneself in keeping one’s word points out a distinction be-
tween the sameness of character and the permanence of self—it is what stays perma-																																																								
24 This approach has been inspired by the work of Dorothea Glöckner, who dedicated a monograph on 
Repetition and another on Kierkegaard’s understanding of the promise, focusing on Works of Love. 
Dorothea Glöckner, Das Versprechen. Studien zur Verbindlichkeit menschlichen Sagens in Søren Kier-
kegaards Werk Die Taten der Liebe, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2009; and eadem, Kierkegaards Begriff 
der Wiederholung. Eine Studie zu seinem Freiheitsverständnis, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruy-
ter 1998 (Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series, vol. 3). Yet Glöckner did not combine these two 
investigations, and it is this connection between the repetition of the self and the promise in Kierke-
gaard’s thought that I explore. 
25 Paul Ricœur, Oneself as Another, trans. by Kathleen Blamey, Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press 1994, p. 118. 
26 Ibid., p. 119. 
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nent even when the character might undergo changes: “Keeping one’s promise…does 
indeed appear to stand as a challenge in time, a denial of change: even if my desire 
were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination ‘I will hold 
firm’.”27  
It is in our promises that we are bound not only by the rules of language (to 
say “I promise x” leads to the obligation to do x), but also by our former self (the self 
that made the promise at a certain point in time). Thus, there might come a moment 
when our inclinations, our habits, our values and our living situation will be totally 
different, in short: when we will not be anymore the same person (in terms of idem) 
we were when we gave the promise. Yet in living up to our word, we are re-
actualizing our self at another point in time and under different circumstances. One 
could also say, in keeping a promise we are repeating our self. 
This way of constituting self-constancy in time inspired Ricœur in his later 
work The Course of Recognition to describe the promise as the paradigm case of ip-
seity.28 Accordingly, the promise should not only be understood as an external obliga-
tion which others demand us to keep, but also as a chance for us to establish an under-
standing of our self as a unity in and through time. We usually think that it is the oth-
er, the receiver of the promise, who gets a feeling of security and affirmation through 
the promise. But the promise also establishes this sense of security for the one who 
makes the promise, because it gives hold in an ever changing life with an overwhelm-
ing amplitude of opportunities. According to Ricœur,  
 
the ‘Here I am!’ [as answer to the claim of the receiver of the promise] by which the person 
recognizes himself or herself as the subject of imputation marks a halt in the wandering that 																																																								
27 Ibid., p. 124. 
28 Paul Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, trans. by David Pellauer, Cambridge, MA and London, 
England: Harvard University Press 2005, p. 110. 
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may well result from the self’s confrontation with a multitude of models for action and life, 
some of which go so far as to paralyze the capacity for firm action. Between the imagination 
that says, ‘I can try everything’ and the voice that says, ‘Everything is possible but not eve-
rything is beneficial (understanding here, to others and to yourself),’ a muted discord is 
sounded. It is this discord that promising transforms into a fragile concordance: ‘I can try 
anything’, to be sure, but ‘Here is where I stand!’29 
 
We can conclude, at least for now: first, through promising, we are able to “repeat” 
our selves in time and under different circumstances, and second, promising yields 
orientation and provides us with criteria for the choices in the course of our life.  
Ricœur’s account of selfhood has of course not been left unchallenged.30 Nev-
ertheless, reading Gjentagelsen in the light of Ricœur’s concept of the promise helps 
to clarify the question whether the young man experiences a repetition, and it also 
highlights how intricate the relation of promising and selfhood is. Let us thus return to 
the young man. 
 
 
IV. A Broken Promise? 
 
The following argument rests on two assumptions: first, that the young man has in 
fact promised the girl to marry her, and second, that an engagement actually is a 
promise, even though the performative act of becoming engaged is not signaled by the 																																																								
29 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 167f. 
30 For a detailed critical reading of Ricœur’s account of selfhood see Claude Romano, „Identity and 
Selfhood: Paul Ricœur’s Contribution and its Continuations“, in Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in 
Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon, ed. by Scott Davidson and Marc-Antoine Vallée, Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer 2016, pp. 43-59; Henry Isaac Venema, Identifying Selfhood. Imagination, Narra-
tive, and Hermeneutics in the Thought of Paul Ricœur, Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press 2000; and the essays in Ricœur as Another. The Ethics of Subjectivity, ed. by Richard A. Cohen 
and James L. Marsh, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 2002, especially Cohen’s work 
on “Moral Selfhood: A Levinasian Response to Ricœur on Levinas”, in ibid, pp. 127-160. 
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typical “I promise”, but rather by the question “will you marry me?”. I think it is safe 
to infer from Constantin’s statement that the young man “had been in love for some 
time…, but now the object of desire was within reach; he had confessed his love and 
found love in return,”31 together with the young man’s later relief caused by the girl’s 
wedding with someone else, that he was engaged indeed.  
Moreover, I regard an engagement as a promise, because it is (in contrast to a 
marriage) not a judicially binding relation, but a commitment to enter into this relation 
in the near future, usually within a year. Ricœur does not address this matter, but since 
he also uses the more general giving and keeping one’s word in addition to the narrow 
understanding of promising as an illocutionary act, I think one may legitimately say 
that the young man has actually promised to marry the girl. 
At first glance, things appear to be pretty clear: the young man has broken his 
promise—after all, he does not marry his fiancée, and she subsequently gets married 
to someone else. From Ricœur’s analysis of the promise as “paradigm case of ipsei-
ty”32 one all too readily infers that the young man fails to repeat his self: Instead of re-
actualizing the word of his former self under new conditions, he clings to his bachelor 
identity and to the undisturbed sameness of a boundless life-style which he regards as 
the life-style of a poet. Reading the wedding announcement in the newspaper, he cries 
out “I am myself again”33 and immediately gets excited about the prospect that “no 
one calls me to dinner, no one expects me for supper. When the idea calls, I abandon 
everything, or, more correctly, I have nothing to abandon…When I come home, no 
one reads my face, no one questions my demeanor.”34 
																																																								
31 SKS 4, 12 / R, 134. 
32 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 110. 
33 SKS 4, 88 / R, 221. 
34 SKS 4, 88 / R, 221. 
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Due to similarities with Either/Or, we are furthermore tempted to conclude 
that the young man, like the Aesthete, shies away from responsibility, from confining 
himself to a concrete life style, and instead aims at keeping all opportunities open. To 
such a life view, events and persons are relevant only as far as they can serve as mate-
rial for one’s poetic imagination, and ethical considerations are regarded as hampering 
the creative flow. Thus, in Ricœurian terms, the young man does not grasp the chance 
which the promise offers, that is, the chance to counter the seductive ‘I can try any-
thing’ with a self-affirming “but ‘Here is where I stand!’.”35 
But maybe we should give the young man more credit. Maybe he did keep his 
word, albeit in a complicated way. The next section therefore explores two different 
perspectives on the young man’s promise.  
 
 
V. Suspending the Link Between Keeping One’s Word, Fulfilling a Promise, and Stay-
ing Faithful to Oneself 
 
In the following, we will retreat from the story of the young man for a while and take 
a closer look at the phenomenon of promising. Let us start by considering a rather 
paradoxical question: Is it necessary to keep one’s word in order to fulfill one’s prom-
ise?  
Ricœur stresses that we do not have to keep our original intention in order to 
fulfill what we have promised;36 rather, we keep a promise because it is a formal obli-
gation. However, he does not distinguish between different scopes of intention. Imag-
ine two scenarios: In the first one, you have promised a colleague to lend her your car 																																																								
35 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, pp. 167f. 
36 Cf. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, pp. 266f. 
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on Saturday, because she needs to pick up her parents-in-law from the airport. You 
make the promise, because you want to help her getting off with the right foot with 
her in-laws during their visit. In addition, you already planned a bicycle tour for Sat-
urday, so you do not really expect to need the car yourself. The weekend comes and it 
rains without cease. Now you deeply regret your promise, and you do not really care 
about your colleague’s family issues anymore. Still, you lend her the car, because you 
said you would. This promise therefore belongs to the category of promises in which 
the unchanged intention is not part of the fulfillment of the promise: You do not need 
to care for your colleague’s relation with her in-laws in order to lend her your car. 
From the perspective of both the one who makes the promise and the one who re-
ceives the promise, the promise is fulfilled if the word is kept literally. 
There is, however, a different category of promise. Consider a second scenar-
io: Someone is asked to become the godmother of her friend’s daughter. The friend 
asks her to raise the child in case she would die, and the godmother agrees. She prom-
ises to care for the little girl, and, urged by her friend, not to let it live with the 
friend’s mother, who is an alcoholic and estranged from her daughter. Now imagine 
seven years later, the friend and the father of the child both die in a plane crash. The 
godmother faces a difficult decision: she is bankrupt, going through a divorce and is 
severely depressed. In contrast, the friend’s mother has turned into a marathon runner, 
claims to be sober, and shows patience and genuine love when interacting with the 
child. The godmother decides to let her godchild live with the grandmother. 
We probably regard it as counterintuitive to say that the godmother has broken 
her promise. The reason for this is that we assume that the main intention when she 
gave the promise to raise her godchild was to do whatever is best for the child. At the 
time when the promise was given, the best scenario for the child was to be raised by 
		
14	
 
the godmother. At the time when the promise has to be fulfilled, the best option is for 
it to be raised by the grandmother. The godmother’s intention stays the same, and in a 
way, she is keeping her promise by breaking her word. And with regard to the ques-
tion of a non-identical repetition of the self, it seems adequate to say that despite all 
the changes she has been going through, she demonstrates self-constancy through 
dealing with her promise in exactly the way she does. 
In order to account for cases like this, the phenomenologist Hans Lipps has 
stressed the genuine openness of a promise: what a given word really means shows 
itself only in the moment of its fulfillment.37 We therefore promise not so much some-
thing, but we promise something to someone, thereby binding ourselves to his or her 
wellbeing. Ricœur says something similar: the promise (and thereby ipseity) is based 
on solicitude.38 In The Course of Recognition, this is formulated in the goodness 
clause:  
 
the speaker does not simply limit himself to ‘placing himself under a certain obligation to do 
what he says.’ This relation is merely from himself to himself. But the commitment is first of 
all to the other to whom the promise is made. It is a commitment to ‘do’ or to ‘give’ some-
thing held to be good for him or her. In other words, the promise has not simply a receiver, but 
a beneficiary of the promise.39 
 
Let us now see what this means for the young man. What if we choose not to view 
him through the eyes of Constantin Constantius, who claims that the young man never 
truly was concerned about the girl? If we take the young man’s words at face value, 
he breaks the engagement because he genuinely cares for her: “My love cannot find 																																																								
37 Cf. Hans Lipps, Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache. Arbeiten zur Sprachphilosophie und Logik, 2nd ed., 
Frankfurt/Main: V. Klosterman 1958 [1944], p. 102; discussed in Glöckner, Das Versprechen, pp. 175-
79. 
38 Cf. Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 268. 
39 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 129. 
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expression in a marriage. If I do that, she is crushed.”40 Thus, one could say that the 
young man’s original inclination towards the girl, temporarily inflamed by romantic 
feelings and expressed in the promise to marry her, has not changed at all. If an en-
gagement is understood as the promise to care for the other and to will the best for 
him or her under all conditions, the young man kept his word by breaking it.  
However, as has been shown earlier, keeping a promise is not only about the 
other—it is also about oneself, which leads to the second question: Is it necessary to 
keep a promise in order to stay faithful to yourself? On the one hand, Ricœur appears 
to be very rigorous with regard to the link between ipseity and keeping a promise. He 
defines ipseity as the “will to self-constancy, to remaining true to form, which seals 
the story of a life confronted with changes of circumstances and changes of heart.”41  
Such a will constitutes the fundamental promise which “precedes any promise 
making,” that is, the promise of “keeping one’s word under all circumstances.”42 In 
this case, the one who gives the promise is the same person as the receiver of the 
promise. In keeping a promise, we would thus per definitionem stay faithful to our-
selves. This, however, is counterintuitive, as Ricœur himself points out with reference 
to Nietzsche: “one can promise actions but not feelings; for the latter are involun-
tary”43—or in Ricœur’s words: “What the speaker commits himself to is to do or give 
something, not to experience feelings, passions, or emotions.”44 
What does this mean in the case of the young man’s engagement? On the one 
hand, if the promise to marry the girl did include the suggestion that he would love 
her until the end of time, he had not only exceeded his own abilities, but also the ca-																																																								
40 SKS 4, 69 / R, 201. 
41 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, pp. 129f. 
42 Ibid., p. 129. 
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, transl. by R. J. Hollingdale, 
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996, p. 42, no. 58; quoted in Ricœur, The Course of Recogni-
tion, p. 129. 
44 Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 129. 
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pacity of a promise. On the other hand, if he had simply committed himself to fulfill a 
legal act in due course without implicating love, this would have been heartless, and it 
would have been even more heartless to go through with it after his love has withered. 
So, after all, an engagement might not really be a promise, or if it is, it is deceptive.45 
In Either/Or, Judge William addresses this problem in his letter on The Esthet-
ic Validity of Marriage. He distinguishes between three forms of love: romantic love, 
reflective love, and religious marriage. He then compares these forms by asking 
whether they fulfill the requirement of an eternal love. Romantic love is characterized 
as immediate and, since it is based on beauty and erotic attraction, it is temporal, elu-
sive. Reflective love is best illustrated in a marriage of convenience: here, ‘love’ is 
grounded on an act of will, determined not to let change affect the relationship. How-
ever, since this kind of love is subdued by calculation and a “pedestrian commonsen-
sical view that one ought to be cautious…, that life never does yield the ideal,”46 this 
relation succumbs to temporality as well.47 According to William, only in the reli-
gious marriage the promise of eternal love can be fulfilled.48 
However, religiosity is not easily achieved. Grace might be involved, and the 
absurd. The young man of Repetition does not appear to have lifted his love to the 
level of religiosity. He raises it to the level of abstract infinity, to poetry—that is all he 
is able to do. It might be socially condemnable that he does not keep the promise of 																																																								
45 Nietzsche suggests something similar; since love cannot be promised, it is sufficient to provide the 
appearance of love, that is, to deceive the other: “To promise always to love someone therefore means: 
for as long as I love you I shall render to you the actions of love; if I cease to love you, you will contin-
ue to receive the same actions from me, though from other motives: so that in the heads of our fellow 
men the appearance will remain that love is still the same and unchanged.—One therefore promises the 
continuation of the appearance of love when one swears to someone ever-enduring love without 
self-deception.” Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 42, no. 58. Ricœur does not consider such ele-
ments of deception and self-deception that can be evoked by a promise. 
46 SKS 3, 35 / EO2, 27. 
47 According to Ricœur, such reflective love would not count as an expression of ipseity, but simply as 
a demonstration of obstinacy, and “we need to place as much distance as possible between self-
constancy and the constancy of an obstinate will.” Ricœur, The Course of Recognition, p. 134. 
48 Cf. Ryan Kemp, “‘A’ the Aesthete: Aestheticism and the Limits of Philosophy”, in Kierkegaard’s 
Pseudonyms, ed. by Katalin Nun, Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate 2015 (Kierkegaard Research: 
Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 17), pp. 1-25, p. 9. 
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his engagement, but at least he does not force himself to feel something that is not 
genuine, thereby betraying not only the girl, but also himself. Re-actualizing his self 
under new internal conditions—he has understood the nature of his love to the girl 
and takes the responsibility for it—, the young man dares to break with the norms of 
bourgeois Copenhagen: he willingly repeats his self, even though it is a self “that 
someone else would not pick up of the street.”49 
 
 
VI. Once Again: Promising and Repetition 
 
What can we conclude? I have provided two perspectives on the young man’s break 
of the engagement. These two approaches are not easily combined, in fact, they seem 
to contradict each other. The first one states that the young man kept his promise (un-
derstood in a broad sense): when one regards solicitude as the crucial element in 
promising, the young man has fulfilled the promise to care for the girl. The second 
perspective, however, claims that since love cannot be promised, the engagement is 
not actually a promise, or put differently: promises of such magnitude are usually 
overpowered by the fundamental promise to be faithful to oneself. According to the 
latter approach, the young man has broken his promise to the girl. Both approaches, 
however, suggest that through his promise the young man has repeated his self. 
Ricœur does not account for self-constancy or ipseity in the case of a broken 
promise. However, from defining solicitude and care for the other as motivation for 
giving a promise, it follows that if the reason to break a promise is genuine care for 
the other, one could argue that self-constancy indeed is achieved: Pondering over a 
																																																								
49 SKS 4, 87 / R, 220. 
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promise’s implication at a new moment in time, out of care for the other and not be-
cause one’s own interest, habits and preferences have changed (even though they 
might have changed), implies ipseity: The caring self is repeated under different cir-
cumstances. 
The second interpretation focused on the fundamental promise to oneself. Also 
here, I expanded Ricœur’s considerations and pointed out that the cardinal promise to 
be faithful to oneself has the capacity to trump a promise given to another (regardless 
whether it is based on solicitude or not). After all, we cannot willingly evoke a senti-
ment, thus it is impossible to promise to feel something. If the fulfillment of a promise 
includes a profound feeling, we can absolve ourselves from the obligation. One could 
say that in struggling with the enormity of certain promises and negatively relating to 
their obligations, one repeats one’s self under the paradigm of their impossibility. 
Thus, keeping a promise no matter what does not automatically entail a genuine repe-
tition of one’s self. 
Ricœur hints at something similar when he warns: “The obligation to maintain 
one’s self in keeping one’s promise is in danger of solidifying into the stoic rigidity of 
simple constancy.”50 And as Repetition’s experimenter with the telling name Constan-
tin Constantius unwillingly demonstrates in his foundering endeavors to reproduce 
identical experiences, culminating in the weary submission of his life to “a monoto-
nous and unvarying order,”51 the stoic approach fails to repeat the self. 
 
																																																								
50 Ricœur, Oneself as Another, p. 267. 
51 SKS 4, 50 / R, 179. 
